Russia’s Sovereign Internet Law Will Destroy Innovation
By the time the law is implemented, Russia will be lagging behind the rest of the world.
The Russian authorities have
embarked on unprecedented measures to control internet content. Under
what has become known as the sovereign internet law passed by the State
Duma on April 16, internet providers will be obliged to install devices
to filter traffic, and the state communications watchdog Roskomnadzor
will get unparalleled powers, including an official “off switch” to
deploy as it sees fit.
The official reason given for introducing
such drastic measures is the preponderance of illegal content on the
internet, and the purported intentions of Russia’s enemies to cut the
country off from the internet. But in all likelihood, the law is driven
by growing discontent in Russian society, and the authorities’ falling
ratings. On the horizon is a series of elections for regional governors
and the State Duma, and, after all, 2024 — the end of Putin’s
presidential term — is closer than it seems. It will be far easier to
overcome these challenges if Internet content is under control.
Since March 2017, the authorities have
repeatedly been taken off guard, first by mass protests organized by
anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny and then by ecological
protests against landfill sites. Both the political and ecological
protests took place across many Russian regions. Discontent was also
expressed via protest voting at the gubernatorial and mayoral elections
in fall 2018, when candidates backed by the authorities lost to spoiler
candidates in several regions.
For the Kremlin, this is a serious
problem. Traditional measures such as banning pro-Kremlin media from
covering protests, or blocking mobile internet access in specific
regions (such as in Ingushetia during protests over changing its border
with Chechnya), did not produce the required results. The
self-contained, regional nature of the protests makes it impossible to
nominate and demonstratively punish a single scapegoat, so other
solutions are needed.
The domestic policy bloc of the
presidential administration increasingly tries to run Russia as a
corporation. It’s not surprising, therefore, that they have resorted to
typical corporate methods in the field of internet control.
In business, deep packet
inspection (DPI) technology is used to identify leaks and monitor which
websites employees are visiting. It analyzes both the titles of the
packets being transmitted and their contents. DPI devices known as black
boxes are installed at the edge of the provider’s network at the break
with existing communication channels, and all the traffic leaving or
entering the network goes through the devices, making it possible to
monitor and control it. The technology enables traffic to be
prioritized, speeding up some packets and slowing down others, such as
social networks on which illegal content is being distributed. The new
law will oblige all internet providers to install DPI devices on their
networks.
The type of equipment will be chosen by
Roskomnadzor, and it is the state communications watchdog that will, “in
the event of threats to the stability, security, and functional
integrity” of the internet, direct the routing of traffic and block
sites (previously, it was the providers who were responsible for
blocking sites when ordered to by the watchdog). In other words,
Roskomnadzor will flick the on/off switch when the situation requires
it. The cost of installation will be covered partly by budget funds and
partly by internet users: providers have warned that the cost of
internet services will increase.
It’s far from clear how capable automated
systems are of filtering the internet in the way that the authorities
would like. Roskomnadzor has unsuccessfully been trying to block the
Telegram messaging service for an entire year, using DPI technology
provided by the company RDP.ru, which is part-owned by the state telecom
provider Rostelecom. Recently, training connected to Roskomnadzor’s
ability to block sites and redirect traffic to black boxes caused some
perfectly legal services provided by Russian internet giant Yandex to
become unavailable.
Slowing down or switching off the internet
at one company, even a huge one, undoubtedly results in losses and a
certain amount of inconvenience, but it’s not fatal. At the national
level, however, it’s a different story. Black boxes make the decision to
forcibly route the traffic or degrade its speed automatically, without
differentiating between individual internet users, companies, schools,
or hospitals.
If that equipment affects the work of a
network user, such as a hospital during a high-tech operation, the most
that the provider can do is lodge an enquiry with Roskomnadzor as to
whether filtration was in action at that moment. Clause 5 of the draft
law made it quite clear that no one can be held liable in such
situations.
Installing black boxes that
will operate automatically will inevitably lead to lower network speeds.
This will effectively put an end to the development of the Internet of
Things, driverless transport, telemedicine, and other innovation-related
initiatives that are supposedly on the government’s agenda. Proposed
amendments to the bill pointing out these risks were apparently ignored.
What the law’s authors would really like
to see is something akin to the Great Firewall of China, which blocks
undesirable external traffic and filters out internal information that
is negative or otherwise undesirable. But the Russian authorities
acknowledge that it’s too late to introduce something similar here.
There are both technical and social
reasons for that. The Chinese internet was built differently from the
start, and has only a few traffic exchange hubs with the outside world,
making it quite easy to control. Russia has several hundred, including
ones of whose existence Roskomnadzor and the security services are not
even aware, according to a participant in the relevant meetings in the
presidential administration: hence the reliance on DPI, which is not
used at a national level anywhere else in the world.
In addition, the Chinese authorities have
successfully substituted most global internet services — from payment
systems to social networks — with their own homegrown systems. When
users are all congregated on the same platform, such as WeChat, they are
easier to control. Furthermore, a convenient interface significantly
reduces the risk of users leaving that platform for a Western rival.
Russia doesn’t have its own equivalent of
WeChat, and moving over to domestic IT solutions would be painful for
both ordinary people and businesses. Outlawing popular foreign services
on the basis of ostensible threats would certainly not go down well.
The Kremlin sees technology as a modern
solution to the growing wave of negative feeling among Russians that has
been recorded by sociological research for the last few years. That
research shows that people are spending less, social aspirations are
declining, and expectations of improvement are low. A decrease in the
standard of living has already led to a serious decline in the
authorities’ ratings.
But Kremlin officials, who focus largely
on the mood of the president rather than that of Russian society,
apparently underestimate the political risks of this slump in their
ratings.
One potential mechanism for
maintaining stability is artificially inflating ratings by leveraging
information: not just by focusing on the positive, but by literally
blocking out the negative. It was right after the regional governor
elections in September that the presidential administration discussed
testing DPI technology. It’s possible that the technology will be tested
at the upcoming Duma elections in 2021: after all, the authorities’
falling ratings are dragging down the ruling United Russia party’s too.
Then it could be rolled out in full force in 2024 for the presidential
election.
By that time, incidentally, Russia will be
noticeably lagging behind the rest of the world in terms of technology
as a result of its slow Internet. For that particular problem, the
powers that be don’t yet have a solution.
This article was originally published in Carnegie Moscow Center.
The views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of The Moscow Times.